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Accounting Income and 2 Executives' Pay:
The Effect of LIFO-Switching and Firm Ownership
Abstract:
Empirical research on agency theory postulated that managers'
choice of accounting methods is, to some extent, motivated by the impact
of the chosen methods on their bonuses. In particular, it has been
argued that income increasing policies will be selected by executives
whose bonuses are determined as a function of accounting income.
The accounting change to LIFO was chosen for this study
because of its unique attributes: it increases the economic income
by reducing the actual payments of taxes, but it decreases accounting
profits as reported to stockholders. If the latter were to be used
in the determination of executives' compensation, the incentive to save
taxes by changing to LIFO would be reduced.
The empirical results in this paper are based on analysis of
the changes in the structural relationships between income and
executives' compensation for a sample of 176 firms. One-half of the
sample consists of firms that switched to LIFO. The analysis covered
a period of four years: two before the change, the year of the change,
and one year after the change. The evidence presented does not support
the 'bonus hypothesis' in that executives bonuses were not adversely
affected by the change. Two possible explanations were mentioned: the
first is concerned with re-contracting the bonus arrangements such that
it would be based on pre-change accounting method (FIFO) , or to increase
the percentage of income that is being granted as a bonus. The second
is that the switch to LIFO was made by companies whose executives have
reached the maximum contractual limits for income-based bonuses.

EXECUTIVES' PAY AND ACCOUNTING INCOME:
THE EFFECT OF LIFO-SWITCHING AND FIRM OWNERSHIP
Much of the research on the change in the accounting method of
inventory valuation has focused on the consequences of the LIFO choice.
Little has been done concerning managers' motivation for electing to
change the inventory valuation to LIFO. This paper examines the
effects of the switch to LIFO on executives' pay—which is sometimes
called "the bonus-hypothesis." Briefly stated, the "bonus-hypothesis"
states that managers select income increasing accounting methods when-
ever they expect their income-based bonus to increase as a result of
having made that choice. This is part of an effort to understand the
motivation of executives in retaining the FIFO method of inventory
valuation when it is clear that the switch to LIFO will increase the
net cash inflow to their firms.
The results of this study suggest that the change to LIFO has no
significant negative effect on executives' pay whether pay is defined
as (a) salary plus performance based bonus in cash and unrestricted
stock, (b) salary, plus bonus, fringe benefits and contingent per-
formance compensation. Hence, the bonus-hypothesis has not been sup-
ported for this sample of 197A switch to LIFO. Two explanations for
this finding are proposed here: either the switch firms adapt their
bonus arrangements or, as some managers have indicated to this author,
they continue to use the FIFO-based income in determining the annual
bonus. Both explanations are consistent with the notion of adaptability
and immaterial recontracting cost. However, it should be clear that
these results do not necessarily refute the bonus hypothesis because of
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possible self-selection bias: firms switching to LIFO are those whose
bonus system is adaptable. It remains to study the motivation for
retaining FIFO before generalizing the results reported here.
1. THE LIFO DECISION
The accounting change to LIFO is unique. Being voluntary, it can
be adopted completely at the discretion of management. Furthermore, it
is accepted by the IRS for tax reporting provided that it is also con-
currently adopted for external purposes. Consequently, the LIFO change
generates conflicting signals: it decreases the reported accounting
income, while it increases the firms net operating cash inflows as a
result of an equal reduction in the actual tax burden. Such a
conflicting signal is typically provided by a stable or a growth firm
that has a positive marginal tax rate which decides to switch to LIFO
during a period of rising prices. Under those conditions, the switch
to LIFO increases the present value of the firm (Sunder, 1976).
Why then do many firms facing those conditions delay making the
switch? The IRS records indicate that "only 2.5 percent of all whole-
salers and 1.5 percent of all retailers use the LIFO Method." (Daily
Tax^ Report, October 5, 1983). In addition, an analysis of the tax
liability of the samples used in this study (sampling is explained
later) indicate the marginal tax rates for 90 percent of the sample of
firms that retained FIFO (88 firms) were positive over a ten year
period just as were the marginal tax rates for the switch firms (also
2
88 firms). Thus, the "tax hypothesis" advanced by others (see for
example, Morse and Richardson, 1982) does not apply at least for these
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two samples. Other studies also indicate the same phenomenon. For
example, Biddle and Martin (1983) proved analytically that the present
value of after-tax inventory profits under LIFO is greater than under
average cost or FIFO cost flow assumptions if the unit cost of purchase
is monotonically nondecreasing. In particular, except for an industry
such as electronics where prices have been falling recently, many
managers could have increased the present values of their firms by
switching to LIFO instead of retaining FIFO. Two possible explanations
for retaining FIFO are considered: they relate to managers' view of
the effects on shareholders wealth or on their own income. Each is
discussed briefly below.
(1) Security Price Effects : Fear of negative effects on security
prices due to reporting a lower accounting income is one possible
explanation for delaying the change. Such a possibility has not been
documented, however. The cross sectional empirical evidence on the
securities market reaction to the LIFO switch is, on average, mixed.
On the one hand, a positive association between the switch to LIFO and
security prices has been reported by Sunder (1973, 1975) and Biddle and
Lindahl (1982). By contrast, Brown (1980) reported no significant
association, Ricks (1982) found a negative market reaction to the
switch, and Abdel-khalik and McKeown (1978) found the market reaction
to be conditional on, and consistent with, the direction of the
deviation of actual earnings from analysts' earnings forecasts that
prevailed prior to the announcements of the switch to LIFO.
Although differences in research design might provide a partial
explanation for the different results reported in those studies, the
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evidence is more in the direction of finding no adverse reaction (on
average) of the market to the switch to LIFO. The missing factor,
however, is managers' own beliefs about market consequences. Although
the empirical evidence is in favor of a semi-strong form of market
efficiency, managers' actions will depend on whether or not they
believe in it. Executives' understanding of this issue is unclear and
the evidence about it is limited (Mayer-Sommer, 1979).
(2) Effects on Executives' Pay : The second possible explanation
relates to managers' own annual income. Kaplan, for instance, asserts
that executives retain FIFO for the fear of what negative effects the
switch to LIFO might have on their own annual pay. He writes:
Executives can take many actions that increase reported
income—and hence increase their (own) income from
incentive compensation plans— but decrease the firm's
value from the owner's point of view. How else can we
explain the persistence of so many United States
corporations in remaining on FIFO for inventory valuation
rather than switching to LIFO (Kaplan, 1982, p. 570)?
This hypothesis has not been tested and is the subject of this
study. Prior evidence concerning the association between executives'
compensation and the choice of the inventory method of valuation has
been mixed (e.g., Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1978; and Zmijewski and
Hagerraan, 1981). Moreover, evidence related to the discretionary
choice of accounting methods (see also, Holthausen, 1981) provides no
support for the view that managers adopt income increasing policies
because of the compensation effect. However, the results reported by
these studies suffer from research design shortcomings which tended to
reduce the explanatory power of relevant variables. One particular
problem arises from the use of a dummy variable (1-0 classification) to
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denote the existence or the absence of an accounting-based profit bonus
plan. Such a dichotomous measure provides very limited information and
fails to discriminate between quantitatively different bonus plans.
The 1-0 classification, for example, is impervious to a renegotiation
of the level or the base of the profit bonus that might result in
completely different incentive schemes since all will be assigned a
value of "1". Furthermore, the one period model implicit in the agency
literature does not permit an analysis of the adaptability of the
agent's compensation contract to changes in the environment that would
motivate changing accounting methods. Thus, it does not allow for the
possibility that managers' renegotiate the particular components of
their compensation plans. Adaptability of the system makes it
irrational for a corporate compensation committee to penalize top
executives by reducing their bonus as a result of their making a
relatively costless decision to increase the net cash flow to the firm.
It is also irrational for the compensation committee of FIFO firms to
reward the failure to switch to LIFO. The setting in this case is
different, however, because FIFO is the "status quo" whereas managers
proposing the switch to LIFO would have to justify departure from
status quo. Unless the compensation committee require^a target return
given certain accounting methods, there is no a priori reason for it to
examine the reasonableness of methods used^or to provide departure
from such methods. The absence of empirical evidence in support of the
"bonus-hypothesis" motivated the completion of the present study.
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2. THE FIRM'S OWNERSHIP
Prior to Che emergence of agency theory, Monson and Downs (1965)
advanced what they called the "theory of large managerial firms."
Essentially, they argued that decisions made by large corporations with
diffuse ownership may not obey the neoclassical economic theory of the
firm and thus might pursue policies that are not necessarily compatible
with the long term value maximization objective. The "theory of large
managerial firms" stipulates that, when control is in the hands of pro-
fessional managers, not owners, executives will consider their own self
interest and will make different choices. For example, Williamson
(1964) argued and Smith (1976) tested the hypothesis that those managers
"will respond to changing environmental conditions in such a way as to
attenuate intertemporal variations in performance in comparison to a
prof it-[value] maximizing management" (Williamson, 1964, p. 299).
Several accounting studies have postulated that pursuing different
objectives by the executives of owner-controlled and manager-controlled
firms is reflected in the accounting choices they make. The studies by
Smith (1976), Tranter (1978), and Dhaliwal et al. (1981) were concerned
with the choice of depreciation policies, accounting policies that lead
to the smoothing of income and the effects of accounting for research
and development for the two types of firms. None, however, has been
conducted on the switch to LIFO and the association with owner-
controlled or manager-controlled type of firm ownership. This
discretionary accounting change is more interesting to study because
the switch to LIFO, given the proper conditions, increases the value of
the firm. In particular, the effect of executives' action on their
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wealth might be manifested in different ways: higher value of stock
holdings for executives with large ownership of shares and higher bonus
for executives who are hired "agents." Thus, it is expected that the
former group switches to LIFO when the conditions are favorable
(positive marginal tax rates, increasing prices and stable or growing
business). By contrast, for the executives of the latter group
(manager-controlled firms), the increase in their wealth from the
change in the value of the firm is a relatively smaller proportion of
their total income by comparison to that of the executives in the
owner-controlled firms. Consequently, different behavioral assumptions
are formulated for the executives' actions of the two types of com-
panies. Since the changes in the values of the insiders' holdings are
not included in this study as part of their annual pay, the classifica-
tion of firms into owner-controlled and manager-controlled is used as a
surrogate measure. It is recognized, however, that this measure is a
simplification and does not capture all the information contained in
value changes of insiders' holding of shares and the results should be
interpreted with this limitation in mind.
Similar to the criterion used in previous studies (Dyckman et al
,
1981; Dhaliwal et al , 1982, and Tranter, 1976), a firm is classified as
owner-controlled if "one party owned 10 percent or more of the voting
stock and exercised active control; " otherwise it is classified as
manager-control (Dhaliwal et al., 1982, p. 48). The 10 percent
insiders' ownership was adopted in this study in classifying the firms
in the sample by type of control.
3. HYPOTHESES
3. a Hypotheses related to the structure prior to making the
accounting change . The above discussion leads to formulating three
null and three alternative hypotheses. The first pair is concerned
with the structure of incentives prior to the switch to LIFO. If the
bonus-hypothesis is valid, the smaller the elasticity of executives'
pay to income, the smaller the expected penalty arising from the change
to LIFO. This hypothesis can be tested by examining the incentive
structure before the change for those firms that subsequently switched
to LIFO and those that retained FIFO. These hypotheses are:
H
1
: Prior to changing to LIFO, the structural relationship
between income and executives' pay was not different
between the firms that subsequently changed to LIFO
and others.
H. : Prior to making the change, the structural relationships
la
between accounting income and executives' pay suggests a
higher bonus component for executives of the firms that
retained FIFO than for those that subsequently changed
to LIFO.
3.b Hypotheses related to the structure after the accounting
change . Regardless of whether or not the incentive structure was
different between the change and the no change firms, the change to
LIFO may have no adverse effects on the executives' bonus if one of
two situations takes place: (1) if executives' bonus is based on the
FIFO-income even after the change to LIFO; or (2) if the bonus arrange-
ment is altered to take into account the lower income base such that
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the dollar amount of the bonus is not affected by the change. Although
anecdotal evidence obtained by talking with several executives lends
support to the former situation (basing the bonus on FIFO-measured
income), either situation renders a situation of adaptation that might
explain some of the negative findings reported in the literature (e.g.,
Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1978).
Since no information can be gathered directly on either situation
(basing the bonus on FIFO income or increasing the percentage of bonus
to offset the effect of the change), the following hypotheses do not
distinguish between them as sources of adaptation:
H« : The change to LIFO was not accompanied by a reduction
in executives' pay relative to those retaining FIFO.
H„ : The bonus component of the executives' pay was
relatively reduced for the switch firms as compared
to others in the year of the change.
3.c Hypotheses related to the effect of firm-ownership . As stated
earlier, manager-controlled firms have the characteristic of absentee-
ownership which renders them closer to "agency" as defined in the
literature. On the other hand, owner-controlled firms are farther away
from "agency" since they are basically controlled by the "principal."
While wealth maximization for the principal is consistent-with maxi-
mizing the present value of the firm, wealth maximization for the
agents (executives in manager-controlled firms) are derived from their
work compensation. Hence, the latter type is expected to take actions
that are consistent with the bonus-hypothesis: Thus, the type of firm
ownership is expected to have implications for making the accounting
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change for which the following hypotheses are designed to test. It
should be noted that the alternative hypothesis is testing the bonus
hypothesis in a setting that differentiates between the two cases:
executives with large ownership of shares (owner-controlled) and those
with minor ownership of shares (manager-controlled).
H~ : The effect of accounting change on executives'
pay was not different for manager-controlled
and owner-controlled firms.
H- : The accounting change to LIFO reduced executives'
pay for manager-controlled firms as compared to
the owner-controlled firms.
4. METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN
4. a Basic Design : The models used in this paper are in some
respects adaptations of the model advanced by Boyes and Schlagenhauf
(1979). They suggested that the log-transformation provided as good an
estimation as the Box-Cox transformation they used. This paper is a
log-linear regression models. It consists of two continuous and two
indicator variables. The basic model takes the form:
LnP. = a + a
n
LnlNC. + a OM. + a- EC.lol i2i3i
+ a. 0M*LnINC. + a, EC* LnlNC.
4 i i 5 i l
+ ar 0M*EC* LnlNC. + e. (Ml)6 i i i l
Where:
P. = the annual pay of CEO for company i
(Pay included salary, bonus, in cash and unrestricted stock);
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INC. = net income for company;
OM. a dummv variable (intercept-shift) denoted
1
= owner-controlled company,
1 = manager-controlled company,
EC. = a dummy variable (intercept-shift) denoted
= for the switch firm
1 = for the FIFO firm
a = intercept term
o
a
,
a
,
a_ = coefficients for the above variables
a,, a_, a. = coefficients for interaction terms (slope-shift)
e. = error term
l
Ln = natural log.
The only constraint that this function may not violate is that the
coefficient of income, a
1 ,
must be non-negative and less than one.
This is necessary since it reflects the elasticity of executives' pay
to income. Such a constraint will be met if the function has construct
validity; that is, no need to impose bounds on a
1
before estimation.
The basic design as indicated by equation (Ml) requires that the
sample consist of firms that switched to LIFO and others which, during
a corresponding time period, retained FIFO. Sampling is discussed
below (item 5.e).
4.b The Dependent Variable : Prior research (e.g., Watts and
Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Bowen et. al., 1981) used
a dichotomous (one-zero) dummy (independent) variable to designate the
existence or absence of a bonus plan. Such a classification does not
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capture the wide range and variability of the bonus component of execu-
tives' annual compensation, which takes on several variations. Several
of those features were reported by the Conference Board (1980, p. 12).
In particular, (a) about 90 percent of the companies surveyed in 1979
had annual performance bonus plans; (b) the 1979 bonus award constituted
100 percent of the salary (equal amount to the salary) of the chief
executive officers in 13 percent of the surveyed companies; and (c) the
percentages of bonus payment to the salary for the middle ranges of pay
(second and third quartiles) of surveyed companies were 39 to 77 percent
for chief executive officers, 36 to 71 percent for the second highest
paid officer, and 34 to 67 percent for the third highest paid officer.
This information elevates the importance of two issues: (1) the use of
a dummy variable does not capture the information included in the
variability of executives' pay, and (2) the CEO's bonus structure is a
reasonable surrogate for the bonus structure of the three top executive
officers within a given firm.
The present paper used the dollar amounts of annual pay (salary and
3
performance based bonus both in cash and in unrestricted stock) of chief
executive officers (CEO) as the dependent variable. The annual dollar
amounts paid to CEOs are filed annually in the proxy statements with
the SEC. A compilation of that information as filed is published by
Forbes
,
but only for the top paid CEOs (the number varied around six-
hundred from one year to another). This is the same source used by
Boyes and Schlagenhauf (1979), Ciscel and Carroll (1980) and Hirschey
and Pappas (1981) in their studies concerning executive pay and the
managerial theory of the firm.
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4.c Independent Variables: Accounting income numbers were
obtained from Compustat as reported for all companies in the sample.
In addition, the effect of the change to LIFO on income (net of tax)
was collected from company reports, Wall Street Journal and other
financial records. These effects were then used to adjust the reported
LIFO-income in the year of the change to obtain the income numbers that
could have been reported under FIFO. Regression equation (Ml) was
estimated for both measures of income (reported and as if ,) in the year
of the change.
The OM variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the company
is owner-controlled or manager-controlled. As explained earlier, a
10 percent ownership of voting stock by insiders was used as the cut-
off between the owner-controlled and the manager-controlled company.
The percentage of insiders ownership was obtained from the companies
filings with the SEC as summarized by the Value Line Investment Survey .
The third variable, EC, refers to the incident of the switch to
LIFO. E stands for the (experimental) switch firms, while C stands for
the (control) companies that retained FIFO during the investigation
period.
4.d Investigation Period : The analysis is carried out for a
period of four years— two years before the change, the year of the
change to LIFO, and the year subsequent to the change. As in Ciscel
and Carroll (1980), Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), and Boyes and
Schlagenhauf (1979), a regression equation was estimated for each year
separately.
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4.e The Sample : The sample consisted of 176 firms, 88 of which
switched to LIFO and 88 retained FIFO during the same four calendar
years constituting the investigation period. The switch (experimental)
firms were selected first (after excluding banks, insurance, and utili-
ties) from the list reported by Forbes in 1974, the year in which most
of the change took place. Several data requirements were imposed on
the selection process that resulted in the 88 switch firms. The data
requirements consisted of the following: (1) The company must be
currently listed (in 1981) on Compustat in order to obtain sales and
assets data. (2) Financial institutions and utilities are excluded.
(3) Executives' pay data would be available for the company for three
of the four-years investigation period. They represented 51 industries
(using the three digits of the standard CUSIP industrial
classification)
.
The other 88 (FIFO) firms were also selected from the Forbes list.
In addition to satisfying the three data requirements listed above, it
was also required that no change of inventory method valuation was made
by those companies during the investigation period. Since the investi-
gation period was essentially determined by the change year for the
experimental sample, another requirement was imposed on the FIFO
sample: it must represent the same composition of fiscal years as the
experimental sample. Once the selection was made, the two samples were
combined for each year separately. The FIFO sample was comprised of
companies in 57 industries (also using the three digit-classification).
Given that the selection process centered around the calendar year
of the change, some variation in sample size existed from one year to
-15-
the other due to missing data. That is, some firms did not make the
list of the Forbes list of CEOs in some years. The smallest sample size,
however, consisted of 132 companies for the fiscal period of two years
before the change. For the remaining periods, the sample size was not
smaller then 149. A company was excluded from estimation in the year
in which it had missing data.
5. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
5. a Model Estimation . Model (Ml) was estimated for each year
separately with two separate regressions estimated for the year of the
change: one for income as reported (LIFO), and the other using the
pro forma
,
as if (FIFO) income. The results of estimating model (Ml)
are reported in Table 1. As shown, heteroscedasticity in the residuals
was observed in all regressions, except for the year before the change
(year -1). Notwithstanding this estimation bias, the functions behaved
as expected: The coefficients of income were consistently significant
(at p < 0.01), positive, and less than one; the functions were statistically
2
significant (p < 0.01); and the levels of adjusted R were reasonable
for cross sectional analysis. Nevertheless, the bias introduced by
heteroscedasticity makes it difficult to evaluate the significance and
4
the meaning of those coefficients.
Insert Table 1 here
5.a.l Correcting for Heteroscedasticity Assuming that Model (Ml)
is the True Model . The test for heteroscedasticity used here is the
Glejser test (Johnston, p. 220) in which the absolute value of the
residuals are regressed on some form of the independent variable,
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LnlNC. Having obtained significant coefficients indicates that the
variance of the error terms was proportional to the independent
variable, LnlNC.
In this situation, a weighted least squares is recommended.
Deflating all the variables in (Ml) by the LnlNC (that is, the weight
of the regression is [1/LnINC]) and applying OLS is equivalent to using
a weighted least squares (see, Commons, 1976, pp. 459-462; Neter and
Wasserman, 1974, pp. 131-136). Thus, the weighted least squares
version of (Ml) is as follows:
LP.Cl/LnlNC.) = b (1/LnINC.) + b
n
+ b„ (1/LnINC
.
)0M.
l 10 il2 11
+ b-(l/LnINC.)EC. + b. OM. + b c EC.3 l l 4 i 5 l
b, OM.*EC. + e.(l/LnINC.) (Mlw)Oil i i
Where all terras are as defined in Ml. The estimated coefficients
in this function correspond to those of the original forra (Ml), but
(Mlw) has the additional econometric nicity of reducing the problem of
heteroscedasticity where such a problem existed. That is, the coef-
ficients b and b~ are intercept-shift since b = a , b = a«, and
2 3 v o o 2 2'
b» = a • while the coefficients b,
, b,. , and b, are slope-shift sincej J 4 5 6
b
l
= a
l»
b
4
= V b5 = a5' and b6 = V
Since the estimate of the regression of year -1 was not heterosce-
dastic in the initial estimation (as shown in Table 1), there was no
need to use weighted least squares for that year's data. However, such
an application should provide a check on the quality of the estimated
-13-
function reported in Table 1 for year -1. Accordingly, five
regressions were estimated for (Mlw) as was the case with (Ml).
The results of estimating (Mlw) are presented in Table 2. As
2
shown, adjusted R were significantly higher as compared to the estimates
provided in Table 1 for the years in which corrections for heterosce-
2dasticity were required. Adjusted R~ was 0.66 as compared with 0.33
for year -2, 0.81 as compared with 0.25 for year (as reported and as
if), and 0.82 as compared with 0.24 for year +1. As expected, however,
weighted least squares did not perform as well as OLS for year -1, the
year for which OLS provided best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) and
for which data transformation was not required.
Insert Table 2 here
Given these results, the BLUE estimates of the functions are
reported in Table 2 for years -2, 0, and +1; and are reported in Table
1 for year -1.
5. a. 2 Correcting for Heteroscedasticity Assuming that Model (Ml)
is Misspecif ied . The above analysis assumed that executives' pay is a
function of income, but the economics literature on managerial pay
examined whether executives are actually paid to maximize profits (the
neoclassical theory), or to maximize sales subject to a constraint for
the rate of return (Baumol's hypothesis). The results of extensive
testing of both hypotheses led to mixed results. Even in the case of
Ciscel and Carroll (1980), who initially attempted to resolve the
problem, implied that the source of increasing profits can't be
distinguished as to whether it is through sales growth or cost control'
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(1980, p. 13). Almost all of the studies on the subject found both
sales and profits to be empirically significantly associated with
executives' pay (e.g., Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970; Boyes and
Schlagenhauf , 1979; and others cited in those articles). Although the
validity of those results would depend on the extent to which the
authors had successfully dealt with the raulticollinearity between sales
and income, they question the validity of the model used here. In
particular, if the results of the studies on managerial pay provide a
correct specification of the pay structure, then our model (Ml) would
be misspecified for having omitted a relevant variable, sales.
In order to correct for this misspecif ication, model (Ml) was
augmented. Due to the raulticollinearity between sales and income (and
their functional dependence), other studies orthogonalized those two
variables by regressing income on sales and using both sales and the
residual of income in the regression that evaluates executives' pay.
This approach was used here before abandoning it because, in some
years, the coefficient of the residual of income was insignificant.
Since the objective of this paper is to evaluate the effects of
accounting change that affects income on executives' bonus, orthogona-
lization of income and sales was done differently. Sales were
regressed on income and the residuals, RS, were used to represent
sales. This approach permitted a full representation of income as an
independent variable. Accordingly, model (Ml) was augmented by
including the RS variable, which has the coefficient a_ . This is then
considered model (M2).
The regression estimates of model (M2) are reported in Table 3.
The Glejser test for heteroscedasticity was not significant in any of
-21-
the five regressions. Also, the coefficient a, of the sales residuals
was consistently significant (p < 0.01) and positive. It is not clear,
however, that (M2) regressions explain the pay structure better than
those of (Ml). Consider, for example, the regression estimates of year
+1 for owner-controlled firms that switched to LIFO under both models:
LnP. = 3.97 + 0.15 LnlNC. + e. (Using (Mlw) ; ¥2 = 0.82)
LnP. = 4.03 + 0.146 LnlNC. + 0.16 RS . + e. (Using (M2); ~R2 = 0.31)
l ill
After having added a significant independent variable (RS) to the
2
first equation, the adjusted R was not expected to be so much dif-
ferent from that of the weighted least squares, especially since both
are not heteroscedastic. But, model (Mlw) clearly explains a signifi-
cantly higher proportion of the variation in pay than model (M2).
Finally, interpretation of the coefficient a_
^ s complicated by the
differences in signs of the coefficient and of the measurements of RS.
Although the coefficient a? is consistently positive, the term as a
whole is as equally likely to be positive as negative since the RS are
the residuals from a regression— their expected mean is zero.
Furthermore, the interaction between RS and the variable OM and its
derivatives might be of concern. To understand this problem, consider
the correlations between RS and each of OM, 0M*INC, and 0M*EC*INC shown
in Table 4. Although these correlations are relatively low, their
existence could be the reason that the significance of the coefficient,
a,, for the interaction terra 0M*EC*INC was eclipsed by introducing the
6
RS variable.
-22-
Insert Tables 3 and 4 here
Given these problems in the interpretation and estimation of (M2)
with the introduction of a term for sales, there is no reason to
believe that (M2) is a more correct specification of the underlying pay
structure than (Ml) and (Mlw) . In this paper, the basic model (Ml)
will be used as if it is the correctly specified model, even though the
results of estimating (M2) will also be discussed. A reconciliation of
the findings of both models is attempted at the end of the next section,
Using the basic model (Ml), the BLUE used in examining the findings
are: (i) those reported in Table 2 (using [Mlw]) for the years -2,
(as reported), (as if), and +1; and (ii) the estimate regression
reported in Table 1 for year -1. When the alternative model (M2) is
used, all the estimates reported in Table 3 provide the basis for
discussion.
5.b Findings . Discussion of the findings follows the three stages
used in presenting the hypotheses. At first, the basic model and the
results of its estimation are discussed as if it is the appropriate
specification of the pay structure. The results of (M2) follows. Then
a final note summarizing and contrasting various findings is presented.
5.b.l The Period Before the Change . The research interest in this
period lies in understanding the pay structure that prevailed prior to
the year of the change. In particular, it is necessary to develop an
appreciation for whether the pay structure was sufficiently different
for those firms that retained FIFO from others that had subsequently
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Table 4
Correlation Coefficients Between
RS
.
(Sales Residuals) and Other Variables
1
in Model (2)
Variable Year -2 Year -1 Year
(as reported)
Year +1
OM +0.17 0.15 0.25 0.22
0M*INC +0.17 0.14 0.21 0.18
EC -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.04
EC* INC -0.028 0.01 -0.06 -0.09
0M*EC*INC 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.09
1
Note: Correlation with income is 0.0, by contruction
-25-
changed to LIFO to warrant making any inferences about the managerial
motives.
Using the BLUE estimates for the period preceding the accounting
change (from Table 1 for year -1, and from Table 2 for year -2), some
differences in the pay structure between different groups of firms
existed. In particular, the significance of coefficient a, for the
o
interaction term OM*EC*LnINC suggests that the manager-controlled firms
that retained FIFO had a higher income-based bonus than those that sub-
sequently switched to LIFO. That is, the elasticity of pay to income
is equal to a, + a, (a. and a c are not included; due to lack ofn 16 4 5
significance their coefficients are noise) for that group of firms
(where OM = 1, and EC = 1) whereas it is equal to a only for all
others. Thus, the null hypothesis H is rejected in favor of the
alternative hypothesis H^ for this subset of fi rms
(manager-controlled) that did not subsequently change to LIFO.
5.b.2 The Year of the Change . The hypotheses stated for this year
relate to the adaptability of the pay structure as a result of making
the switch to LIFO. The regression estimates reported in Table 2 (for
Mlw) are used to develop the following relationships:
For the switch firms (both owner- and manager-controlled)
LnP. = an + a., LnlNC. + e.l 1 11
LnP. = 3.12 + 0.222 LnlNC. + e.
l 11
For the FIFO firms (owner-controlled)
LnP. = (aQ + a„) + (a + a5 )LnINC + e.
LnP. = 4.46 + 0.072 LnlNC . + e.
l li
-26-
For the FIFO firms (manager-controlled)
LnP. = (an + a_) + (a, + a c + a, )LnINC. + e.l 03 156 11
LnP. = 4.46 + 0.108 LnlNC. + e.
l 11
These functions are characterized by four observations. (i) The
pay structure for the executives of the switch firms was the same for
both types of firms, manager-controlled and owner-controlled, and was
characterized by a higher elasticity of pay to income than for those
that retained FIFO. (ii) The pay structure of those retaining FIFO
differed, by the firm's ownership; the manager-controlled firms had a
higher coefficient (resulting from a significant interaction term
measured by a,) than the owner-controlled firms. This observation
reflects the same relationship that existed prior to the change. (iii)
The ratio of the bonus component of the switch firms to the bonus com-
ponent of those that retained FIFO was higher by comparison to the
ratios of the same measures in prior years. (iv) These three obser-
vations are common to both regressions estimated for year —the one
regression using income as reported and the other using income as if no
change took, place.
By comparison with the functions estimated for the years before the
change, this result in the year of change suggests that the switch
firms have adapted to the effects of the change in the form of a larger
income-based component of their compensation. Further, the similarity
between the LIFO and the a— if regression suggests that the adaptation
may not have been in the form of basing the bonus on the FIFO income.
The similarity of the two functions, however, raises questions about
the discriminating power of the test. In any case, these results
-27-
do not lead to rejecting the null hypothesis H„ and H_ ; that is, no
adverse effects of the choice of LIFO on executives' bonus is observed
even for those firms that are manager-controlled.
5.b.3 The Year after the Change . Using the regression estimate
for year +1 in Table 2, the observed statistical significance of coef-
ficients a_ and a, (at p < 0.01) suggests the following relationships
(using significant coefficients only):
For the switch firms (both owner and manager-controlled)
LnP. = an + a n LnINC . + e.l 1 li.
LnP. = 3.97 + 0.15 LnINC. + e.
l 11
For the FIFO firms (owner-controlled)
LnP. = a~ + (a + a c )LnTNC. + e.l 15 11
LnP, = 3.97 + 0.04 LnINC. + e.
i 11
For the FIFO firms (manager-controlled)
LnP. = a- + (a, + a c + a,)LnINC. + e.i 15 6 11
LnP. = 3.97 + 0.074 LnINC, + e.
l i l
These relationships essentially indicate a continuation of the
basic structure that prevailed during the year of the change. In
particular, by comparison to others, the switch firms appear to have
adapted to the lower LIFO-based income either by increasing the LIFO
profit-share that is paid as a bonus to executives, or by continuing to
use the as if (FIFO-based) income to determine the amounts of the
bonus. Both types of adaptation are consistent with obtaining a higher
regression coefficient when the LIFO income is used in estimation. In
addition, the results continue to show that, of the firms that retained
-28-
FIFO, the manager-controlled firms had a higher bonus component.
Accordingly, the decisions made concerning HL and H remain unaltered.
5.c Consideration of the Alternative Model (M2) . It was stated
earlier that model (M2) has been included for two reasons: (1) It is
consistent with the empirical models on executives' pay that have
appeared in the managerial economics literature. And, (2) it provides
a quality check on the results of (Ml) in the event that (Ml) is not a
correct specification of the pay structure. Without actual inspection
of various bonus contracts, the uncertainty about which of these, or
any other, models as the appropriate form for representing the pay
structure cannot be resolved.
The estimates of model (M2) are reported in Table 3. Several
points are suggested by the regression estimates reported in that
table. These estimates indicate the following:
(i) No difference in pay structure was detected before the change
between the FIFO firms and those that subsequently changed to LIFO.
This is different from the results of estimating (Ml) which indicated a
difference between manager-controlled FIFO firms and others in the two
years before the change.
(ii) During and after the year of the change, the coefficient, a,,
o
of the interaction term OM*EC*LnINC was statistically significant
(at p < 0.01) and positive. This is consistent with the results
obtained from estimating (Ml). Moreover, none of the other coef-
ficients concerning the accounting change was statistically signifi-
cant. Such a result implies the inability to reject the null
-29-
hypothesis H which was the case with the analysis of (Ml). The
change in the significance of the coefficient a., however, from the
pre-switch to the switch period implied a rejection of H~ for this
subset of firms (the manager-controlled firms that retained FIFO).
5.d Summary and Contrast of the Findings . The findings of
estimating (Ml) and (M2) are summarized in Exhibit 1. As indicated,
the results obtained by both models are not substantively different.
There is no evidence of adverse effects of the switch to LIFO (on
income decreasing) policy on executives' pay. With exception of the
other finding that manager-controlled firms which retained FIFO have a
relatively greater income-based bonus by comparison with others during
and after the year of the change, the overall evidence suggests that
the switch firms have adapted. Adaptation might have taken place in
one of two forms:
}
Insert Exhibit 1 here
(1) changing the bonus contract in order to permit the use of a lower
(LIFO) based-income, or (b) continuing the use of the pro forma FIFO
income for the purpose of the determination of the bonus. Given these
findings, it cannot be concluded that executives with income-based
bonus contracts do not select income decreasing accounting policies.
The different findings between (Ml) and (M2) with respect to the
significance of the coefficient a, leads to a slightly different
b
interpretation. One might argue that the relatively higher bonus com-
ponent of a subset of the manager-controlled firms was a motive for
retaining FIFO; and that motive existed before making the change (if Ml
-30-
Exhibit 1
Summary of Che Findings and
Contrasting the Results of Various Models
Period Model Model (Ml) or
(Mlw)
Model (M2)
A. Pre the change
to LIFO
(a) FIFO, Manager-
controlled firms had
a higher income-
based bonus
(a) No difference in
pay structure between
groups of firms
(b) Partial rejection
of H
;l
for that group
of firms
(b) Cannot reject H .
ol
B. The Change Year (a) Same as (a) above (a) FIFO, manager-
controlled firms had a
higher bonus component
(b) Adaptation of
bonus or of its base
(b) No other effects of
the switch to LIFO
(c) Cannot reject
2o
(c) Cannot reject H„
2o
(d) Cannot reject
H_
3o
(d) Partial rejection of
3o
C. The year after Same as (B) Same as (B)
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is true) or in the year of the change (if M2 is true). Such an
interpretation, however, questions the difference between the manager-
controlled firms that changed to LIFO and those that retained FIFO. A
further understanding of the structural properties of the bonus
contracts is needed to better explain the motivation for managers who
retain FIFO, an issue that could not be adequately explained by the
evidence presented above.
6. LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Two main findings were obtained: (i) switch companies appear to
have adapted their bonus-pay to reflect the effect of the LIFO change
on income by reconstructing the functions (indices) of their bonus
contracts. That is, this income decreasing accounting change did not
adversely affect the income-based performance bonus awards for
those executives who elected to make the switch to LIFO. (ii) A subset
of the manager-controlled firms that retained FIFO appear to have a
relatively higher income-based bonus as compared to others.
The results obtained in this paper cannot be generalized beyond the
sample used here without further replication. Moreover, the limi-
tations of various measurements must be considered. Executives' pay
was measured by the sum of salary, cash bonus, and performance bonus
granted in unrestricted stock. Although using another measure of pay
(see Appendix A) did not alter the findings significantly, the exclu-
sion of stock options and changes in the market values of executives'
stock holdings limit the generality of these results. It is important
though to note that the use of other alternative models beyond the two
-32-
presented in the text did not alter the results. The results of some
of those models are presented in Appendix B.
While the limitations presented above are intended to alert the
reader as to the incompleteness of this paper, they raise additional
research questions that should be interesting to follow.
-33-
Footnotes
The Congress has recently taken interest in simplifying "LIFO
computation" in order to allow more firms to take advantage of the
attendant tax savings. Even with such simplifications the IRS reports
that the majority of firms have not changed to LIFO. (See, Daily Tax
Report
,
October 5, 1983.) Also our analysis (to be reported later)
shows that most FIFO firms would have benefited by the switch to LIFO.
2
Tom Frecka provided the following. Using ray sample, he calculated
the ratio of taxes payable to sales for each firm (switch and control)
for each of 1972-1982 years and in over 90 percent of the cases, the
marginal tax rate was positive. The averages of taxes payable to sales
ratios were as follows:
Year
Sample
1971 1972 1973 1975 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
LIFO 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.022 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.021 0.014
Control 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.021
I would like to thank him for allowing me to use his data.
3
In this paper, "pay" is defined to include salary, cash bonus and
bonus in unrestricted stock. Another definition of pay adds to these
three components fringe benefits and deferred performance payments (see
Appendix A). However, both definitions exclude stock options granted,
termination clause, golden barachutes, personal tax situation, ...,
etc. and other changes in managers' wealth about which no adequate
measurements can be readily developed. It is important to note,
-34-
however, that the measurements of pay used in this paper are the same
used by managerial economists (e.g., Boyes and Schlagenhauf , 1979;
Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; and Hirschey and Pappas, 1981).
4
I would like to express ray appreciation to the anonymous reviewer
who asked to investigate this issue. Several corrections have been
attempted as reported in the paper and in Appendix B.
The (Mlw) model in the text was the result of applying the weight
(1/LnINC) to model (Ml) as follows:
Let
c
tl/LniNC.)= K^, then model Mlw is as follows:
LnP.(K.) = a
o
(K.) + ^ LnlNC. (K.) + a
2
0M.(K.) + a^ EC.(K.)
+ a OM *LnINC (K ) + a,, EC.*LnINC.(K )
+ a EC *OM LnlNC (K.) + e.(K.)uil ii 11
(See Commons, 1976 for discussion)
c
The goodness of fit of the regressions is the same regardless to
whether the functions employs sales and the residuals from income as
variables, or income and the residuals from sales. That is, the method
of orthogonalizing the two variables influences the coefficients of
income and sales, not the explanatory power of the entire function.
Given that our objective is related to the effects of decrease in
income resulting from the accounting change on the executives' pay, it
is more sensible to use "income" to represent the commonalities of
sales and income measures. The inclusion of income and the residuals
of sales (after filtering out the common elements with income) in the
-35-
regression facilitated the interpretation of the coefficients of the
income variable vis-a-vis. executives' pay and the accounting change,
The objective of this study was to assess the effects of
switching to LIFO and, by implication, understand one possible con-
sequence that FIFO firms tried to avoid. Yet, the direct motivation
for retaining FIFO needs to be examined further.
-36-
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